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Introduction 
 
 
Participation is a term that by its own nature reflects the desire to be a part of something that is 
greater than the individual experience. In modern societies, the desire to socialise is most often 
positioned within the political borders of democracy. The rise of representative democracy, 
beginning in the seventeenth century and exerting its political power with increasing force in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, formalised what was originally a socially-held demand for 
participation. In light of this tradition, citizen-participation has for many years been considered a 
means of connecting the elected government with the wider social community.  Mechanisms 
such as voting have been designed to communicate the interest of the public to their 
representatives. In recent years, citizens‟ failure to engage with these mechanisms has generated 
a growing body of literature on declining levels of participation. This failure has also led to the 
inability of liberal democracies to legitimise their own authority. 
In response to this dilemma, new democratic innovations emphasising the importance of 
participation to democracy have been developed.  From the 1980s onwards, the theory of 
deliberative democracy has come to the forefront of debates over the legitimacy of representative 
government and the idea of consensus politics. It has also coincided with a renewed interest in 
the relationship between social and economic rights and political emancipation. My thesis will 
examine participation with a view of understanding: its perceived fairness, shortcomings and 
future directions. The expositions in this study are guided by an overarching analysis of 
deliberative democracy and political emancipation in order to determine the importance of 
citizen-participation to modern societies. This approach is facilitated by Nancy Frasers‟ (1991) 
theory of participatory parity:  
„Participatory parity is essential to a democratic public sphere and that rough socio-
economic equality is a precondition of participatory parity ... laissez-fair capitalism does 
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not foster socio-economic quality and ... some form of politically regulated economic 
reorganisation and redistribution is need to achieve that end‟ (Fraser 1991, p. 74).   
Fraser‟s theory of „participatory parity‟ performs the role of a critical barometer when analysing 
notions of citizen participation within the strictures of this dissertation. The theory of 
„participatory parity‟ is based on the principles of redistribution and recognition. In this theory, 
Fraser conceptualises political, social and economic rights as inter-reliant, mutually securing 
individual and collective emancipation (Fraser, 1991 p. 65). The idea of a standard for 
participation is an important development at a time when participants in contemporary 
democracies are often disengaged from the political process. The feelings of disempowerment 
and the desire to participate are discussed in the following chapters.  
In Chapter 1: I begin with a discussion on the modes of social life that have come to define 
contemporary democracies. The writing of Charles Taylor (2004) and Cornelius Castoriadis 
(1997) are used to identify the features of modernity. They define this period in relation to 
popular sovereignty (democracy), the public sphere and the economy. In his introduction to the 
theory of the modern social imaginary, Taylor (2004) explains modernity to mean:   
„... the historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms 
(science, technology, industrial production, urbanisation), of new ways of living 
(individualism, secularism, instrumental rationality); and of new forms of malaise 
(alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution‟ (Taylor 2004, p.1).  
Modernity refers to the social practices that came to define Renaissance Europe and continue to 
influence Western democracies (Powell 2008, p.51). The problem of citizen-participation is 
situated within the legacy of this period. Ancient and Modern ideas of liberty and the limitations 
these contrasting approaches place on participation are discussed in this section. The argument 
that there is a demand for participation is brought about by the comparison of Athenian 
democracy and modern liberalisms. This demand is exemplified by new democratic innovations 
that include participatory democracy, new social movements, participatory budgeting, intimacy 
as democracy and deliberation. These developments are important to contemporary discussions 
on participation and political emancipation.  
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Following the discussion it will be suggested that in modernity alternative ways of thinking have 
lead to a paradoxical situation that poses problems for democracy. Simultaneously, an 
ideological discourse on political emancipation has occurred, which expounds the idea of 
„individual freedom‟. Emphasising individualism arguably diminishes the importance of 
solidarity, the liberty which typified Athenian democracy, to contemporary democracies 
(Wagner 2008, p. 37; Castoriadis 1997). This dualism is further explored in the theories of 
participation expounded in the political liberalisms of elite (representative) and participatory 
democracy.  
In the Weberian theory of elite democracy, citizens‟ participation is limited to voting in 
democratic elections. The possible problems of this definition of participation will be analysed in 
relation to the ability to secure political rights and the foundations of political emancipation in 
participation. The contradictory character of these competing ideas places modern notions of 
participation in a precarious position, questioning the extent to which contemporary theories of 
citizen-participation are in fact participatory. The empirical studies of Joseph Schumpeter (2003), 
Robert Michels (1962) and Seymour Lipset (1964) are used to examine the inadvertent limits 
placed on individuals by a restricted concept of liberty. The writing of the aforementioned 
political sociologists drew mostly negative conclusions about citizen-participation, interpreting 
low voting turn-outs as symptomatic of apathy.  
In Chapter 2: The spatial borders of democratic participation are discussed with relation to 
physical setting that foster social action. The notion of an autonomous public space is important 
to both ancient and modern democracies (Mouffe 2000). The public spaces of civil society are 
thought to comprise this space and they are explored for their potential to oversee citizen-
participation. This section is broken into two main sections: civil society and the public sphere. 
Civil society is increasingly thought of as, „a mediating space between the private and public 
spheres in a pluralist democracy‟ (Powell 2008, p. 50). This version of civil society is rooted in 
classical liberalism and more recent considerations of the influence of communication 
technologies on everyday life.  
The philosophical traditions of Max Weber, Karl Marx and Jean Rousseau lay the foundations of 
this investigation into participation. In contemporary accounts of participation, the influence of 
these philosophers can be seen in the political systems of representative democracy; in the 
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questions over conditions that foster individual and collective emancipation; and in moves to 
extend democratic practices beyond the bureaucratic arm of the nation-state. They are also 
emblematic of the modern liberal, Marxist and participatory political traditions as well as distinct 
portrayals of civil society. The different depictions of civil society are also discussed in relation 
to their social roles. This includes a setting for participants to debate ideas and take part in the 
decision-making processes of self-government (Keane, 2009).  
Constituting this arena are the public spaces where individuals meet to form collectives: spaces 
such as parks, town halls, schools, community centres and the public institutions that represent 
citizen concerns (Barber 1984, p. 228). More recently, the virtual commons of the internet have 
also been theorised as constituting a public sphere (Castells, 2008). The public sphere can be 
pictured as a discursive arena that exists within the communication networks in civil society. It is 
the writing of Jurgen Habermas (1996) that informs the definition and exposition of the public 
sphere. He positions the communication networks that constitute this space within civil society 
and links participation in this arena to political emancipation. Habermas (1996) argues the only 
way to overcome social and economic inequalities is through the discourse principle and rights 
of communicative action which are exercised in civil society. Habermas states that in order to 
realise individual liberty:  
„... the sought-for internal connection between popular sovereignty and human rights lies in the 
normative content of the very mode of exercising political autonomy, a mode that is not secured 
simply through the grammatical form of general laws but only through the communicative form 
of the discursive processes of opinion- and will-formation‟ (Habermas 1996, p. 103-4).  
The connections between the modern concept of emancipation, the public sphere, civil society 
and deliberation further outline the dimensions for evaluating participation. It is at this point that 
the theories of Cornelius Castoriadis, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser and Jurgen Habermas 
overlap in a bridge between the first and second chapters. They further outline social and 
economic rights that can foster citizens‟ participation and strengthen modern democracies. The 
analysis of deliberation takes place in the following chapter and tied to this theory is the notion 
that civil society could act as a forum for deliberation.  
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In Chapter 3: An exposition of the deliberation theories of Jurgen Habermas (1996), John Rawls 
(1993) and Joshua Cohen (1993) are used to define deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy reinterprets citizen-participation as an involvement in an open dialogue built upon the 
normative foundations of the discourse principle. Participation in deliberative versions of 
democracy requires citizens to engage in a reasoned debate and deliberate over a range of 
possible outcomes, building consensus in the process. It is based upon three distinct forms of 
reason: “communicative reason”, “overlapping pluralism” and “reasonable pluralism” 
(Habermas 1996; Rawls 1993; Cohen 1999). The legitimacy of deliberative democracy is based 
on the normative grounds of the discourse principle: „Just those action norms are valid to which 
all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in a rational discourse‟ (Habermas 1996, 
p. 107).   
Deliberative democracy positions the legitimacy of representative government on normative 
grounds and presents a procedure for testing those norms. The content of the norms in question 
are not defined, and their moral integrity is based on the public reason of participants (Bevir 
2010, p. 519). The deliberation process opens political discussions to the general public and 
invests in their ability to reconcile differences as well as make informed decisions. The major 
criticism of this model of democracy is not so much the procedural approach it employs but the 
failure of this theory to take into consideration the reality of political, social and economic 
inequality (Mouffe 1999; Elderman 1998; Kalyvas 2003).  
It is difficult to measure the success or failure of deliberation for the simple reason that there are 
relatively few large-scale or longitudinal studies possible on a relatively new development.  In its 
current expression, deliberative democracy is most often thought of as a mechanism for sporadic 
forms of political engagement. The “mechanisms” facilitating this interaction range from forums, 
to citizen juries, polls, mediated online discussion as well as televised voting (Carson, 2001). 
These approaches attempt to connect the government with participants during the entire term of 
their governance. At this point in time, it is unclear whether these deliberative forums lead to 
greater government accountability or if they are still building public awareness of different issues.  
It has been found that in many deliberative forums, participation is limited to middle income and 
university educated citizens (Polletta and Lee, 2006).  
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In the Conclusion: An analysis of the deliberation and participation in modern societies will take 
place. In this section it is Nancy Fraser and her theory of participatory parity that frame debate 
on the principles of deliberation. The norms offered by both advocates of deliberative democracy 
and their critics create an evaluative framework for discerning the extent to which deliberation 
fulfils its claim to socialise democracy. Alternatively, its implementation as a mechanism may 
further isolate already marginalised citizens. It is suggested that the success of deliberative 
democracy is directly tied to the ability of participants to effectively communicate their concerns 
and transform their desire to influence the structure and character of society into a meaningful 
expression of advocacy. The normative principles of participation, including discourse, parity 
and autonomy, are important to modern democracies. At a time when the autonomy of public 
arenas that were designed to facilitate participation is being discredited by economic and 
political systems, the protection of individual liberties is also at stake.   
The introduction of new standards of participation, and therefore, a normative criterion of 
legitimacy can change the perception of citizens. It can move away from the notion of an 
apathetic public towards a more positive account of the coming together of social beings to 
pursue a better way of life.  The methodologies of critical theory used in this thesis emphasises 
the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of society. As Horkheimer illustrates, 
the aim of critical theory is „to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them‟ 
(Horkheimer 1982, p. 244).  It is believed that democracy provides the ideal setting for 
counterbalancing the social inequalities produced by unfettered entrepreneurship, and opens the 
notion of universal consensus to ever-extending audiences (Horkheimer 1982, p. 249-50; 
Habermas 1989, p.).  
Johann Arnason (1990) argues that incompatible models of self-government have been 
constructed as a direct result of the over-interpretation and under-theorisation of democracy in 
social theory. This comes at a time when a sophisticated theory of democracy is needed to fulfil 
the aspirations of political emancipation (Arnason 1990, p.20). He states: 
 „... classical models of theorising are probably better understood as different attempts to 
clarify the relationship between capitalism and industrialisation... these two dimensions of 
modernity were much more extensively thematised and systematically explored than the 
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problematic of democracy. Democracy remained, in other words, an under-theorised 
component of modernity‟ (Arnason 1990, p.26).   
My thesis on citizen-participation explores the possibilities of emancipatory politics. It examines 
the social and economic constraints placed on the ideas of participation and deliberation in 
modern society. The aforementioned philosophers, political scientists and sociologists are 
representative of a variety of literature reflecting both complementary and conflicting 
worldviews. However, each discourse emphasises the importance of political freedom to the 
human experience and ties this concept to the idea of democracy. Their contributions are 
important to the themes of liberty and political emancipation, civil society and the public sphere, 
and deliberation. They also help inform the thesis that although dialogue and reasoned debate are 
attractive ideals, their ability to be associated with political emancipation is restricted by 
economic inequality. Finally, it is hoped that my analysis in the pages of this thesis will 
contribute to a deeper understanding of democracy within social and political theory.  
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Why Participation?  
 
My thesis begins with a detailed discussion on citizen- participative in relation to what might be 
stated as the first feature of modernity: the notion of popular sovereignty.  In this chapter, three 
main approaches to theorising participation are examined within the cultural setting of modernity. 
They include approaches that prioritise the modern political value of liberty, analyses of the 
institutional forms of liberal democracy and citizens‟ participation, and democratic innovations 
that represent new standards of participation. The political value of liberty is examined in terms 
of both positive liberty and negative liberty, whose combined social significance is explained in 
a comparison of ancient and modern democratic cultures. The negative accounts of participation 
that characterised sociological studies of democracy in the mid-twentieth are also discussed as 
are the conclusions drawn from these studies. Finally, the new ways of imagining participation 
are analysed in relation to alternate models of participatory democracy, including those that 
reference participatory budgeting and new social movements. It should be noted that the 
Habermasian idea of communicative action, which theorises citizen participation as a dialogue, 
will be investigated in the next chapter. 
What is typically meant by democratic participation? Peter Wagner (2008) defines participation 
as those types of action that occur in defined spatial boundaries and that are concerned with 
active involvement in processes of democratic will-formation and decision-making (Wagner 
2008, p. 27-28).  In this thesis, following Wagner, it is the spatial boundaries of democracy, both 
real and imagined, that inform the setting for social action. Participation refers to engagement 
with the overriding principles of equality and solidarity that shape modern democracies. 
According to Charles Taylor (2004), democracy can be pictured as a type of common, whereby a 
shared purpose allows otherwise disconnected social beings to congregate (Taylor 2004, p. 85). I 
argue that the ability to converge in the social setting of democracy requires the support of 
specific norms that encourage certain behaviours while quietening others. The moral order of 
democracy steers individual and collective action within the cultural horizons of popular 
sovereignty. This chapter will emphasise then the ways in which individuals come to personally 
identify with the social significations of democracy and later reinforce this self-image at an 
institutional level. 
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The conceptual vocabularies of Cornelius Castoriadis (1997) and Charles Taylor (2004) set out a 
new grammar for theorising the problematic of democracy. In their discourses, the term 
imaginary refers to the formation of customs and rules by people attempting to make sense of 
social life. The concept of an imaginary also implies that the social norms being created are 
continuously changing and exist to the extent that they are mentally and physically embodied in 
the thoughts and actions of individuals, as well as the wider social community.  Castoriadis 
describes the political imaginary in the following terms:  
„.... society constitutes a system of norms, institutions in the broadest sense of the term, 
values orientations and goals of collective life as well as individual life. At their core are to 
be found ... social imaginary significations, which are also created by each society and 
embodied in its institutions‟ (Castoriadis 1997, p. 84).  
The concept of democracy is, in the words of Castoriadis, an imaginary signification comprised 
of social institutions that depending on the period in question are either features of antiquity 
(participatory democracy) or modernity (representative democracy). Castoriadis argues that only 
participatory democracy actually warrants the label. However, the idea of democracy as an 
imaginary signification means, to put it another way, that democracy is „the political 
manifestation of some basic commitment that we all share‟ (Talisse 2009, p. 80).  
A commitment to democracy has serious implications for citizens‟ participation at both the 
personal and institutional level. Taylor‟s theory of a modern social imaginary is primarily 
concerned with the ways ordinary people understand their own social worlds (Taylor 2004, p. 
30). In his writing on the subject of imaginaries, Taylor identifies the economy, the public sphere 
and popular sovereignty as the substantive features of modernity (Taylor 2004, p. 69). According 
to this line of argumentation, the basic characteristics of modernity are unified by political values 
that influence the ways people go about daily life. Modern democracy, for Taylor, is then 
founded on the positive evaluation of participation in ordinary life and the spheres of civil 
society.  
Benjamin Constant (1988) first used the expression the liberties of the ancients and moderns in 
his writing on the spirit of modern societies (Constant 1988).  Constant (1988) argues that the 
liberty of the ancients is the „active and constant participation in collective power‟ while the 
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liberty of the moderns is „individual liberty‟, that is, where the political values of liberal 
democracy guarantee personal freedom (Constant 1988, p. 316, 323).  Taylor (2004) contends 
that the idea of self-interested economic activity provided the new ethical basis for these political 
values. He suggests that liberty “is no longer simply belonging to the sovereign people, but 
personal independence” (Taylor 2004, p. 151).  Isaiah Berlin (1971) defines negative liberty as 
self-protection and separates the concept from notions of fraternity or solidarity (Berlin 1971). In 
general, the theorists of negative liberty tend to accept liberalism‟s assumption that political 
representation is a key feature of democracy and that there need to be constraints on popular 
sovereignty or collective participation in the general will.  
According to Constant, a significant difference between ancient and modern political values is 
the way that personal experience is visualised. The Ancient republican esteem for collectivist 
action comes into direct contradistinction with the modern liberal discourse of individual rights 
(Constant 1988). In its simplest form, classical republicanism or positive liberty sees the role of 
citizens primarily as contributors to a collective form of social action which is tied to the idea of 
the public good.  While modern liberalism‟s idea of negative liberty is concerned with the 
individuals‟ protection from the power of majorities, whether these majorities exist in the form 
of governments, an overarching ideology, religious dogmatism or other forms of domination that 
may stifle personal expression (Berlin 1971, p. 126-7). In effect, these images of positive and 
negative liberty constitute diverging conceptions of participation and my analysis demonstrates 
the extent to which they continue to shape contemporary understandings of democracy. These 
two theories or imaginaries link social action to some image of the common good and personal 
emancipation, although positive liberty tends to be more oriented to the former, while negative 
liberty prioritises the latter and interprets it in terms of private right.  
The notion of self-government, rather than just government, involves a more demanding idea of 
citizens‟ participation in decision-making processes. Democratic societies are supposedly 
distinctive in their adherence to the principle that the laws are made by the people and represent 
the will of the people. Of course, this standard of citizens‟ participation has been enacted in 
different ways and this has led to the construction of disparate political forms, even to the extent 
of democracy being defined in elite terms, which contradicts its original meaning as the rule of 
the people, the masses or the demos. The history of democracy begins with the study of the 
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political societies that came to characterise ancient Greece in the years between 500-300 BCE 
(Dunn 1992). The Athenian city-state model continues to inform the modern understanding of 
democracy and influences contemporary perspectives of citizen-participation (Tilly 2007).   
The institutional framework of Athens was comprised of popular assemblies, law courts and an 
active citizenry united by a political order that was set on the foundations of self-governance and 
full citizen participation (Hornblower in Dunn 1992, p. 6). These features of Athenian 
democracy were developed in a time of aristocratic or oppressive political regimes as well as 
widespread tyranny (Keane 2003). The institutional forms of democracy were built on the 
political values of classical republicanism, otherwise termed as a commitment to ancient notions 
of justice, freedom, equality and solidarity (Aristotle 1981, p. 196-7; Held 1996, p. 23). The 
political signification of Athenian democracy imagined citizens as deliberative actors able to 
communicate differences and listen to contrary views; a feature of democracy that enables its 
continued relevance in times of social and cultural change (Castoriadis 1997, p. 87).  According 
to this model, participation meant a process whereby an active citizen engaged with his 
contemporaries in a democratic polis (Held 1996, p. 36).  As Aristotle states, „ ... what 
effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving 
judgement and in holding office‟ (Aristotle 1981, p. 169). 
Aristotle may not have been a strong advocate of democracy, however, his account of citizens‟ 
participation is important (Castoriadis 1997, p. 88-89). Aristotle‟s writing on democracy 
describes Athenian ideas of citizens‟ participation as man‟s collective actions based firmly on the 
principles of dialogue and deliberation (Castoriadis 1997, p. 90).  Participation in an open public 
space for discussion was seen as a practical way to further the social goals of citizens which were 
steered by the Aristotelian conception of the „good life‟ and pursuit of happiness (Farrar in Dunn 
1992, p. 17; Aristotle 1981, p. 196). During this period the notion of citizenship rights and 
responsibilities was fostered by a general deference of personal aspiration to the collective will 
(Tilly 2007, p.27; Constant 1988). The right to participate in „giving judgement and in holding 
office‟ were guided principles of equality and solidarity that are antithetical to the type of 
individualism common to modern democracy. Direct democracy was a defining feature of the 
Athenian model and the implementation of this political system was closely aligned with a legal 
system that was supportive of broad political participation (Castoriadis 1997, p. 91).  
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The idea of the „good life‟ and pursuit of this social objective via collective action lead to 
participation being viewed as a virtue in and of itself. The education of citizens regarding 
political virtues was integral to the maintenance of the republican democratic culture and 
participation in collective law making, holding office and the public provision of laws in settings 
and language that was accessible to all citizens (Castoriadis 1997). However, The Athenian 
model of a participatory democracy was limited in terms of its definition of citizenship and its 
exclusionary practices. Those who participated were a minority of male elites. Slaves, who Tilly 
considers comprised the majority of the population in the narrow jurisdiction of the city-state, 
were excluded from the social imaginary of democracy (Tilly 2007, p. 26; Castoriadis 1997; 
Held 1996, p. 23). Democracy at this time was, to quote David Held, an „adult male culture‟ 
which excluded women, children, foreigners and slaves (Held 1996, p. 23).  It also included 
practices that could be considered at odds with democracy‟s egalitarian ethos, most notably 
popular elections for certain roles which were for the Athenians an aristocratic principle 
(Castoriadis 1997). It could also be noted that popular assemblies were also a feature of the 
ancient Sumerian, Mycenaean and Phoenician societies, even though the extent to which they 
met the criteria of democracy can be questioned (Keane 2003, p.xi Hornblower in Dunn 1992, p. 
1-2).  
The scale and complexity of modern societies are typically seen as problems for direct 
democracy and citizen‟s participation. While this thesis is certainly not a history of occidental 
Europe, it is important to acknowledge that the notions of popular sovereignty and representative 
democracy came to prominence during the period in which the nation-state became the dominant 
political entity and market capitalism expanded. These two aspects of modern democracy can 
also be traced to the emergence of the public sphere and, as the next chapter highlights, civil 
society (Habermas 1989). As such, this section looks in greater detail at the political values that 
shaped democratic societies in modern times. It is also shown that the way liberty is defined has 
a direct impact of the types of participation that are considered possible. The comparison of 
Athenian democracy and modern liberalisms represent contrasting ideas about society. They also 
present dissimilar accounts of the way society should be structured. It will be shown that the 
modern interpretation of participation is at odds with democracy.  
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During the early twentieth century Max Weber developed a theory of political legitimacy, which 
became the basis of an elite theory of democracy and later political sociologies of citizen-
participation (Weber 1968). Weber was writing in response to two features of the institutional 
make up of modernity: mass parliamentary democracy and bureaucratic organisation (Arnason 
1990, p. 24). Weber‟s sociological conception of democracy is opposed to ideas of direct 
democracy and contradicts the latter‟s claim that democracy is intrinsically anti-authoritarian. 
Instead, Weber emphasised the importance of rationality to modern democracy. Weber‟s 
justification of elite democracy, which is based on a representative system of governance, was 
that it is the best political model for social stability and prosperity. In this model of democracy, 
citizen-participation is primarily thought of as voting in democratic elections (Held 1996). 
Weber‟s treatment of democracy informs the writings of political sociologists Joseph 
Schumpeter, Robert Michels and Seymour Lipset, who studied citizen-participation in relation to 
the apparatus of the nation-state, as well as the character and organisation of political movements 
and parties. 
During the 1950s and 1960s studies of elite democracy sought to explain the prosperity and 
stability of capitalist societies by uncovering the circumstances that fostered democracy (Lipset 
1963). Schumpeter (2003) argued in a similar vein to Weber in his writing on socialism and 
democracy. According to Schumpeter the majority of participants in democracies are self-
motivated and ill-informed making participation beyond voting undesirable. Rather, the 
Weberian notion of rotating élites is theorised as the most attractive model of democracy 
(Schumpeter 2003, p. 250-283). In contrast to this position, Michels‟ (1962) is highly critical of 
the elitist structure of democracy.  Michels‟ research into the organisational structure of 
democracy found that the democratic values of equality, or belief in the greater good that were 
thought to characterise public institutions, were undermined by a tendency of these organisations 
to form oligarchies. The empirical studies Agrarian Socialism and Union Democracy by Lipset 
built upon Michels‟ earlier work, and while both authors observe similar trends, they drew very 
different conclusions from these studies (Lipset 1950, 1994; Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956). 
Lipset found that the organisations in democracy functioned democratically and situated this 
argument within broader studies on the social factors that enhance democracy (Lipset 1950; 
Lipset et al 1956). Political sociologies narrow definition of participation, voting and 
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membership of a trade union or political party in many ways fails to examine the range of 
activities participants engage in to promote democracy.  
The empirical approaches of political sociology conceptualise democracy as a process of 
ongoing conflict, within and between, organisations in a battle for political power (Lipset in 
Michels 1962, p. 36). The definition of democracy as a contest inevitably leads to a fairly 
restricted notion of citizens‟ participation: labour unions and the fight for workers rights, 
political parties and winning popular elections, voting and the promotion of private interests. The 
studies of Michels, Weber and Lipset each focus on distinct aspects of the political process and 
present different interpretations of the interactions at play in political procedures. Yet, their 
studies are similar in emphasise and highlight the importance of the nation-state to modern 
democracies and voting as a mechanism for both widespread engagement with this institution 
and the legitimisation of its authority. Nonetheless, I believe that the shortcomings of 
participation that they found are actually a result of their limited definition of citizens‟ 
engagement and their failure to consider alternate forms of political participation, such as forms 
of protest and involvement in public discussions.   
Robert Putnam is often considered to have modified these earlier political sociologies by 
emphasising the importance of participation, however, I argue that Putnam presents a vision of 
declining participation and that his research could be interpreted as providing empirical support 
for elite democracy. Putman‟s (1993; 1998) studies on civic traditions in Italy, and later focus on 
volunteering in America, arguably share greater commonality with these earlier political 
sociologies than with the ideas of participatory democracy. In his writing on democracy, Putman 
is mostly concerned with the themes of association, reciprocity and volunteerism. Putman (1993) 
suggests that civic associations enhance rather than restrain the ability of public institutions to 
uphold democratic ideals. In Making Democracy Work the author presents his theory of social 
capital as the social and economic valuing of civic engagement:  
„... horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the 
economy, rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy: strong society, strong 
state‟ (Putman 1993, p.126). 
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Theories of social capital focus on the importance of participation to democracy and are 
dissimilar to earlier studies on political liberalism and citizen-participation in that they position 
political action within the broader framework of civil society. Putman is also influenced by 
liberal economy views of society and the writing of Mark Granovetter (1973;1974) whose study 
of social networks makes causal links between individuals and broader structural change.  
Criticism of Putman‟s studies into democracy come in two forms: the first suggests that his 
arguments are tautological and therefore fail to draw valid conclusions about the circumstances 
that foster democracy (Portes 1998) while, the second argues that declining memberships of 
cultural associations can also reflect more inclusive social attitudes depending on the type of 
clubs or societies examined (Kaufman 2002).  
Despite differences in approach, the findings of political sociologies and more recent studies on 
associations consistently point to the formation of oligarchies and declining levels of 
participation.  Although, it has been argued that the many of the conclusions drawn from 
research in these areas are distorted by employing narrow definitions of participation, the 
legitimacy of liberal democracies is inherently tied to a political process which classifies citizen-
participation as voting or to a lesser extent membership of an association.  The so called „crisis‟ 
of liberal democracies is subsequently their inability to self-legitimise (Talisse 2009).  In 
response to this situation democratic innovations that represent new standards of participation are 
emerging and combine issues of legitimacy and private and public autonomy. Developments in 
this area include writing on participatory democracy, new social movements, participatory 
budgeting, intimacy as democracy and also deliberative democracy. At the centre of these 
models of democracy is a concern for the social and economic conditions that combine to secure 
political rights.  
The scale of modern democracies is used to justify representative systems of government and as 
an argument against direct democracy (Castoriadis 1997; Dahl, p. 279). If we agree that the size 
of society places limits on citizens‟ participation then the difficulties facing liberal democracies 
and their legitimacy changes to a question of accountability.  Liberal democracies are built upon 
capitalist markets and guided by a discourse on freedom that positions both aspects of society in 
an inter-dependent relationship (Constant 1988).  Robert Dahl (1995) suggests that the 
irregularities produced by market capitalism generate social and economic inequalities which are 
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in need of rectifying to improve the political rights of citizens‟ (Dahl 1995, p. 391).  He also 
argues that the scale of the nation-state leads to a sense of powerlessness which is felt by citizens 
who feel disenfranchised by mass parliamentary democracy (Dahl 1997, p. 279).  
The legitimacy of liberal democracies is tied to the idea that governments are accountable to 
citizens‟ and it is the responsibility of both parties to uphold the integrity of this relationship 
(Waldron 1993). Yet, the irregularities produced by capitalism and the influence of special 
interest groups and commercial agendas on the decision making processes of governments‟ is 
arguably diminishing political efficacy of citizens‟ (Barber; Habermas). In order to improve the 
accountability of governments‟ democratic innovations attempt to reconnect the wider social 
community with those in positions of authority as well as influence the direction of political 
debates in a commercial setting. The need to re-conceptualise participation past the ideas of mass 
parliamentary government and voting is explored in theories of industrial or participatory 
democracy.  Barber (1984) defines participatory democracy as, „politics in the participatory 
mode: literally, it is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the 
name of citizens‟, is conceived of as a more egalitarian and therefore democratic model for civic 
engagement (Barber 1984, p. 151). 
Critiquing liberal democracies and their seemingly uncontested equation of capitalism with 
freedom is the theory of participatory democracy (Macpherson 1977, p.34). Carole Pateman 
(1970) and C.B. Macpherson (1977) position a participatory model of democracy in opposition 
to elite or new conservative models (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1974). Advocates of participatory 
democracy sought to improve the social and economic conditions of participants by 
reinterpreting democracy as a concept whose discourses on equity could be extended to social 
settings such as the workplace. The guiding philosophy of this movement was summarised by 
Macpherson, „low participation and social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more 
equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system‟ (Macpherson 1977, 
p. 94). Participatory democracy was theorised as a complement to representative democracy 
whilst still disapproving of the political system of competing elites and the limits place on 
citizens‟, it also reinterpreted voter apathy or declining levels of participation as a direct result of 
this system (Macpherson 1977, p. 99).   
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Pateman argues that participatory democracy is „dialectically inter-related‟ with the private 
sphere and therefore breaks with the liberal tradition of separating social life and political 
practice (Pateman 1975, p.464).  According to Pateman, the definition of a public space is not 
divided by any unresolved tension between the private and public sphere, participatory 
democracy it is at once political and social without the need to separate these areas. The social 
imaginaries which underpin modern theories of participatory democracy lean on both the 
Athenian model and Rousseau‟s principle of modernity which makes causal links between the 
objectives of the modern project and all of society participation.   
 
„The act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment between society and the 
individual, so that each person, in making a contract, as it were, with himself, finds himself 
doubly committed, first as a member of the sovereign body in relation to individuals, and 
secondly, as a member of the state [political community] in relation to the sovereign‟ 
(Rousseau 1968, p. 62 in Pateman 1975, p. 464).   
 
The corollary position of theories of participatory democracy is the absolution of the political 
boarders of the nation-state as the sole arbitrator on political activity in the wake of new 
parameters which include social life. Political participation is therefore social participation and 
while attempts to democratise the workplace failed the influence of participatory democracy 
continues to be felt in democratic innovations that associate improved government accountability 
with increased citizen-participation.  
 
Participatory democracy highlights the importance of socialisation to citizens‟ participation in an 
attempt to extend Mill‟s idea of political education toward Rousseau‟s participatory institutions 
and Coleman‟s theory of society as political systems. As Pateman states, „apart from its 
importance as an educative device, participation in the workplace- a political system- can be 
regarded as political participation in its own right‟ (Pateman 1970, p. 35).  Participatory 
democracy is reinterpreted as a form of protest in new social movement theories. Developing in 
the 1960s, new social movements exist at the intersection of modern political values such as 
individualism, ideology and democratic politics. New social movements are largely issue based 
organisations with a focus on women‟s, ecological, gay and lesbian rights and peace movements 
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and attempt to restructure the social landscape of society through open political debate. The 
feature, or value, separating new social movements from other forms of participation is their 
emphasis on the personal-experience and individualism. Alberto Melucci writes, „the freedom to 
have which characterised ... industrial societies has been replaced by the freedom to be‟ (Melucci 
1989, p. 177-178).  
Robert Inglehart (1990) looks at the values discourse of new social movements and suggests 
their popularity is based on widespread education and the ensuing increase in political skills that 
are common to modern societies (Inglehart 1990, p. 372). According to Robert Inglehart, new 
social movements are formed at the intersection of „cognitive mobilisation‟- the political skills 
needed for large scale societies- and „values‟ which manifest in the form of different movements 
(Inglehart 1990, p. 373).  Inglehart describes the agenda of new social movements as:  
„the emergence of new social movements owes much to the gradually rising level of 
political skills among mass public, as education has become more widespread and political 
information more pervasive‟ (Inglehart 1990, p. 372).  
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) conceptualises New Social Movements as a more recent 
example of participatory democracy and amplifies their role in the metaphor „democratising 
democracy‟. Arguing that protest participation in a global counter culture not only extends 
democracy past the infrastructure of the nation-state but also promotes the international idea of a 
more egalitarian and equitable political world order (Sousa Santos, p. ix).  While Cohen and 
Arato, (1992) suggest, „social movements constitute the dynamic element in the processes that 
might realise the positive potential of modern civil societies‟ (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 492).  
Countering the enthusiasm for New Social Movements is a growing number of social scientists 
that cite inequality as a concerning feature of this form of participation. The membership is 
critiqued as often being exclusive (Covey 1995), while the capacity of movements to shape 
political progress is tempered by an inability to control how they are represented in news media 
communications (Tilly 1994).  It is also unclear whether social movements empower the people 
they claim to represent or influence social policy to the advantage of politically disenfranchised 
groups (Offe 1985).  
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The themes of exclusivity and a want of political effectiveness in influencing positive social 
change are also limitations of Anthony Giddens (1993) intimate participation. Giddens, intimacy 
as democracy model for participation expounds the view that politically educated persons are 
able to engage with one another through reason. Democratising the private sphere requires the 
personal charter of people to change in order to institute the principles of „freedom‟ and 
„autonomy‟, leading to greater gender equality. The author argues that this process is already in 
place the evidence of which is made apparent by the influence new social movements, and their 
discourse of identity politics, have had on changing the inter-personal relationships of 
participants in the family home, the work place and all other social spaces (Giddens 1993, 
Chapter 10).  As part of the third way discourse, social equality projects are moved from the 
technocratic influence of government agencies and placed in the domain of civil society, yet 
given the complexities this new geography it is unclear whether „intimacy‟ leads to political 
empowerment.     
Participatory budgeting, a political model designed to broaden participation in the decision 
making processes of local economies to poorer and marginalised persons or groups, positions 
participation outside the institutional body of representative government (Nylan 2003). In her 
writing on Regional Budget Forums in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Rachel Abers‟ (2000) found that the 
majority of participants were already members of a community association (Abers 2000, p. 166). 
Similar findings were made in the research of Baiocchi (2005) who reported on the associational 
underpinnings of participatory budgeting, observing that the majority of participants were drawn 
from unions, social movements, non-government organisations (Baiocchi 2005, p. 40).  Social 
class, levels of education and gender inequality also place limits on participation which restricts 
the themes of the issues discussed to a small social group (Cabannes 2004, p. 38). This narrow 
representation of community interests, although arguably an improvement on previous systems, 
highlights the difficulties participatory democracy encounters when attempting to increase levels 
of participation on a foundation of social and economic inequality (Sousa Santos 1998, p. 486).   
Participatory budgeting and all of the aforementioned examples of participation demonstrate, 
firstly, that the liberal separation of private and public liberty places limits on citizen-
participation. It has also been shown that there is a demand for participation that outstrips the 
current social model of deliberating governments and isolated participants. The need to 
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“reconnect” these two groups will be discussed further in the following chapters.  The study of 
participation shows how an emphasis on individualism, while important to society, is displacing 
notions of solidarity at the expense of the political rights of the wider social community.  The 
need to redefine solidarity in a way that can promote both liberal and republican ideas of liberty 
is needed to overcome this tension.  The discussion that has taken place in this chapter, explains 
how the arguments used to support these restrictions such as the scale of society, the complexity 
of contemporary debates and inability of the wider social community to make informed decisions 
(see Weber and rationality), is losing traction at a time when the traditional forms of political 
engagement are failing to maintain their relevance.  
I argued that the social and economic inequalities produced by capitalism lead to the distortion of 
political debates by special interest groups as well as administrative bodies and this prevented 
citizens‟ from effectively participate in decision making processes. Missing from this discussion 
on participation was a more detailed account of civil society, a theme important to movements 
wanting to extend democracy past the bureaucratic arm of the nation-state, and toward an 
autonomous public setting such as civil society.  In the following chapter the democratic 
potentials for increased participation will be discussed in relation. The communication aspects of 
civil society are detailed in an analysis of the public sphere and the introduction of the idea that 
participants can be thought of as communicative actors.   
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A Forum to Participate  
 
 
Free and independent public spaces and the right to associate are essential features of democracy. 
They influence the way participation is imagined and practiced in contemporary societies. The 
notion of civil society, that is a sphere that is independent of the state and the market, is 
increasingly thought of as concept that could lead to the creation of a more participatory society. 
Advocates of this interpretation, desire to increase participation and extend involvement in the 
decision-making processes past the architecture of the nation-state. In this chapter, titled „A 
Forum to Participate‟, classical and modern theorists of civil society are discussed in relation to 
their disclosure of the potential to „democratise democracy‟.  These versions of civil society are 
compared with the Habermasian theory of the public sphere which shows the need to maintain 
open channels of communication for citizens to participate freely. It is then suggested that the 
increasingly globalised nature of society requires new modes of citizen-participation to be put in 
place in order to uphold individual liberty and realise the potentials of political emancipation.  
In Renaissance Europe, the re-emergence of the term civitas, the Latin translation of „polis‟, 
came to reflect superiority in social and cultural status, it is also the root word for contemporary 
and ideologically loaded expressions such as civility, civilisation and civil society (Taylor 2004, 
pp.35-38). Maria Markus (2001) considers civil society to be, „composed of a rich network of 
various voluntary associations, movements and the channels of communication between them 
insofar as they serve as mediating links between the private and the political spheres under 
conditions of respect for (individual and group) autonomy, plurality, the rule of law and civility‟ 
(Markus 2001, p. 1013). Jurgen Habermas‟ (1996) understanding of civil society goes to greater 
lengths to emphasise the importance of communication and the problem solving capacity of the 
public sphere. Habermas contends that the, „core of civil society comprises a network of 
associations that institutionalises problem solving discourses of questions of general interest 
inside the framework of organised public spheres‟ (Habermas 1996, p. 367). 
The idea of an autonomous public space is significant to both liberal and participatory 
democracy (Mouffe 2000, p. 20). In Ancient Greek and Roman democracies, civil society was 
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conceived of as a political society linked to Aristotelian ideas of „the good life‟ and Roman 
notions of „civic virtue‟- political values defined as the ability to place collective interests before 
personal ambition.  The Greek „politike koninona‟ and Roman „societas civilis‟ were titles given 
to autonomous public spaces that acted as the physical setting for political discussions (Kaldor 
2003, p. 10-11). Yet, the exclusionary practices of these political societies led to notions of 
„civility‟ being associated with citizens‟ and contrasted with „barbarianism‟, a term that applied 
to women, slaves and outsiders exclude from public forums (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). The 
civil versus savage dichotomy, restrained egalitarianism and principles of mutual exchange 
comprise some of the basic characteristics of „civil society‟ and although phrased differently 
notions of Euro-centrism and Western cultural superiority (Taylor 2004; Castoriadis 1997).   
In modern democracies, the notion of civil society remained closely aligned with the nationalist 
projects that defined the political boarders of the nation-state (Hegel 1991, p. 12).  Modern 
interpretations of civil society were classified under the arbitrary headings of „leftist‟, „capitalist‟ 
and „nationalist‟ perspectives, which outlined their position on public policy in relation to the 
politics of the nation-state (Walzer 1995).  In classical liberalism, political equality was imagined 
as a social contract that in many ways secularised the Christian principle of human parity, to 
position citizens‟ as equals before the law. The values of social equality and subjugation of 
political and material power to the mass polity were to become integral features of civil society. 
Thomas Hobbes Levianthian juxtaposes a natural tendency toward violence with the peaceful 
character of civil society.  According to Hobbes, civil society is political society charged with the 
responsibility to ensure the personal security of its members. The theory of the state of nature 
represents one of multiple viewpoints that contest the role of civil society.  
Continuing in the liberal tradition, John Locke saw civil society as a public space that was 
distinct from others due to its protection of individual liberties from systems of government. The 
association between civil society and universal justice was made by Immanuel Kant, describing 
an avenue toward universal freedom. Thomas Paine (1969) may not have articulated a clear 
definition of civil society however his ability to link the right to freely associate with individual 
democracy, continues to influence contemporary society. Adam Ferguson first drew the 
important distinction between civil society and the nation-state, in what Keane refers to as, „the 
breakdown of the classical concept of civil society‟ (Keane). The Enlightenment thinkers 
23 
 
brought new meaning to the term civil society while unfortunately maintaining some of its 
prejudices. These include a preference for male participation at the expense of female 
involvement, the euro-centric discourse of man versus savage and at times strict social-hierarchy 
that places individuals on a sliding scale of dignity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).  
 
Offering alternative interpretations to the liberal view of civil society were Jean Rousseau (2003), 
Baron de Montesquieu.  Rousseau outlined two purposes of civil society, peace and prosperity, 
fostered by the overarching principle to the general-will. Rousseau also stressed the importance 
of socialisation to concepts of civil society as a means to educate citizens in civic rights and 
responsibilities. A view shared by Baron de Montesquieu, emphasised the importance of the 
public sphere and collective will-formation to the protection of civil law and private interests.  
These republican leaning interpretations of civil society were further contrasted by Marxist ideas 
about public life. In his study of democracy, Hegel put forward the notion of a public space that 
was at once independent of the dominant political order and also guided by the values of liberty 
and equality.  
Influenced by this critique of modern democracy, Karl Marx emphasised the economic 
perspective of this earlier definition and argued that in capitalist‟ societies- that were guided by a 
competition based logic and government by representation- civil society was little more than a 
society of bourgeoisie elites (Marx 1975). Instead, Marx imaged a „people‟s democracy‟ that 
would revolutionise civil society and lead to a more egalitarian political order. The failure of 
communist regimes is sometimes attributed to the supposed lacuna in Marxist humanism that 
does not afford provisions for separate spheres that characterise the practice of civil society in 
liberal democracies. Although Marxism associated the development of capitalism with 
heightened class sensitivity and the fostering of a revolutionary consciousness the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc and re-emergence of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe led to a rejection of 
Marx‟s equation of civil society and the capitalist market economy (C.B.Macpherson). Gyorgi 
Konrad (1984), Vaclav Havel (1985) and Adam Michnik (1985) sought to construct democratic 
cultures from the vestiges of fallen Marxist regimes by looking to new theories of „civil society‟.   
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Hannah Arendt (1968) and Claude Lefort (1986) further elevated the status of civil society in 
their arguments for an autonomous space within modern democracies.  In recent years, the liberal 
tradition of separate private and public spheres continues however writing on civil society is 
often guided by a lose approximation of the Gramscian model, which positions civil society 
„between the market and the state‟ (Kaldor 2003). According to this version of civil society, 
cultural institutions such as churches, school communities, voluntary associations and other 
social groupings perform the role of autonomous public spaces in democratic societies. By 
emphasising the importance of volunteerism to civil society, Gramsci was able to make direct 
correlations between a participatory public, autonomous public institutions and the ability of 
associations to self-governance by exerting societal pressure on representative governments and 
capitalist markets. The Gramscian concept of civil society influenced resistance movements in 
Eastern and Central Europe as well as Latin America, in the later setting associations spanning 
religious, non-government organisations and businesses worked together to overthrow dictatorial 
regimes (Calderon 2003; Fernando Castro 1979; O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Alfred Stephen 
1988; Weffort 1989).  
The importance of the right to associate and an autonomous public space is also important to 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1956) and his study of the social conditions that foster democratic 
cultures. De Tocqueville understood political equality in terms of self-rule, marking the end of 
aristocratic power in modern societies (Ringen 2006, p.6). De Tocqueville defines the 
importance of the right to associate as, „If men are to remain civilised, or to become so the art of 
association together must grow and improve in the same relation in which the equality conditions 
increased‟ (de Tocqueville 1956, p. 202). In a similar vein to Gramsic, and at times Montesquieu, 
de Tocqueville emphasises the importance of associations to democracy, the practice of 
associating as a form of civic education or socialisation in the culture of democracy, and by 
positioning associations within the public space of civil society, an independent arena separate 
from the interests of the mass parliament. By engaging with this discourse, de Tocqueville 
contributes to a boarder debate on political emancipation.  
The liberal, republican and Marxian critiques of civil society can be used as reference to 
understand the role of public spaces in contemporary democracies. The dimensions of civil 
society have been influenced ideas of emancipatory politics that might be stated as liberation 
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from kinds of traditionalism: religious, social, economic dogmatism under the auspice of social 
justice (Giddens 1991, p. 211). Citizen-participation is found to require individual engagement 
with the democratic institutions that characterise contemporary societies in order to realise the 
objectives of political emancipation (Giddens 1991; 1998).  As Giddens states:  
„Emancipatory politics involves two main elements: the effort to the shackles of the past, 
thereby permitting a transformative attitude towards the future; and the aim of overcoming 
the individual domination of some individuals or groups by others‟ (Giddens 1991, p. 211).  
The late–modern ideas of emancipation break with more traditional definitions of civil society. 
Giddens‟ states that the transnationalising affects of global politics impacts upon the 
individual self-image as well as the relationships forged on the basis of this interpretation of 
individualism. The importance of democracy as intimacy will also be discussed at a later stage 
in this chapter and in relation to the division between private and public autonomy. In my 
opinion, the emphasis on personal experience is a positive development within contemporary 
societies. Yet, this theory of emancipation describes a situation whereby individuals appear to 
be forced into a self-reflexive mood by the dominance of technology and capitalism. While 
some theorists highlight the notion of individual liberty to the personal experience, there is a 
growing discussion on the importance of social and economic equality to political 
emancipation, from the influence of the government and the economy (Arnason 1990, p. 21; 
Habermas 2006, p. 412).  
In late-modern societies, social and economic inequality is thought to be undermining the 
autonomy of civil society. The disappearance of autonomous public spaces from democracies is 
increasingly attributed to effects of unrestrained capitalism (Vitale 2006). Benjamin Barber 
(1984) argues that citizen-participation in civil society requires autonomous public spaces. 
Barber claims that in increasingly urbanised and privatised societies there are insufficient arenas 
to participate (Barber 1984, p.). Similarly, the need to locate new settings for citizen-
participation are being theorised in response to the diminishing status of the nation-state. It is 
argued that as commercial agendas, exemplified by political marketing and special interest 
groups, exert economic power over democratic procedures (Castells 2008, p. 79; Taylor 2004; 
Barber 1984). The growing influence of neoliberal economic agendas is contested by counter 
cultural movements, which are referred to using the motif „democratising democracy‟ (Sousa 
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Santos 2009). In light of these developments, political emancipation is being reconceptualised as 
not only liberation from political systems, but also, freedom from capitalism. 
Civil society is an important feature of modernity and it is closely associated with the theory that 
public spaces can enhance the ability of citizens‟ to safeguard individual liberties, an idea that 
links private and public autonomy (Vitale 2006; Cohen and Arato). As such, new theories are 
developing to answer questions concerning the ideal setting for social civic participation, the 
ability of citizens‟ to self-govern and the ability to realise the types of freedom promised by the 
enlightenment project. These include:  the public sphere, the global public sphere and the global 
civil society (Habermas 1989 [1962]; Giddens 1998; Kaldor 2001; Keane 1988; Volkmer 2003; 
Held 2004; Fraser 2007). Apart from describing trends in fiscal markets, telecommunications and 
social networking, these terms are also part of a normative discussion on the ability of 
participants to exercise political rights (Arnason 1990; Castells 2008; Granovetter; Giddens 
2001).  
Jurgen Habermas‟ enters this debate with his theory of the public sphere which defends the need 
for autonomous public spaces in order to uphold the individual liberties of citizens‟. The public 
sphere can be defined as, „the sphere of public authority‟ (Habermas 1996), or to borrow an 
expression from Nancy Fraser, „the sphere of private people [who] come together as a public‟ 
(Fraser 1991). Fraser describes the public sphere as, „a theater in modern societies in which 
political participation is enacted through the medium of talk‟ (Fraser 1990; Habermas 1989, p. 
18-27). The theory of the public sphere is part of the Habermasian critique of modernity. 
Habermas seeks to reunify the fragmented spheres of society by way of a discursive model of 
democracy that identifies citizens‟ as the central actors in modern societies (Habermas 2006; 
Fraser 1990). According to this theory, citizen-participation in the public sphere assumes certain 
social and economic rights, in order to enable both public and private autonomy. That is, the 
public sphere becomes central to the links of participation and deliberation (Habermas 2006, p. 
412).  
Although theorised at a much later point in time, the public sphere can be thought of a new 
interpretation of the concept of civil society, which is similarly concerned with an autonomous 
public space for citizen-participation (Habermas 1989, p.30; Kocka in Keane 2006, p. 38).  The 
fall of medieval nobilities and the feudal system during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
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marked the major structural transformation at the centre of a Habermasian critique of the 
bourgeoisie public sphere (Habermas 1989, p. 18). A defining feature of the bourgeoisie public 
sphere was the growing political influence of the middle classes on the political structure of 
society and the emergence of representative democracy during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century (Habermas 1989, p.20). The evolution of the press, which coincided with the expansion 
of mercantile trade routes, facilitated a new mode of information distribution that unheard of in 
traditional feudal societies (Habermas 1989, p 20). The emergence a reading public was fostered 
in part by the improved economic position of the middle classes, as well as the development of 
the printing press, and broad dissemination of news media (Habermas 1989, p 21). This 
structural change also led to the re-emergence of civil society as an important aspect of everyday 
life in European societies and the importance of this public space to modern democracies.  
Michael Mann analyses of social power and class relations undermines the historical evidence 
Habermas uses to support his claim of a neutral setting for the formation of public opinion and 
publicity (Mann 1986; 1983). Adopting a similar line of argumentation is Fraser who criticises 
the assumed inclusivity of civil society in her critique of the Habermasian theory of the public 
sphere. Fraser primarily takes issue with the notable absence of women from the public sphere 
during the eighteenth century, as well as the narrow definition of citizenship imposed by nation-
states or representative governments, which limits the ability of tearooms, coffee houses or 
fraternal associations to evidence the emergence of an autonomous space (Fraser 1991).  Despite 
its limitations the public sphere can be still be used as, to borrow an expression from Fraser, „a 
conceptual resource‟, which facilitates the social critique of post-welfare state capitalist societies 
(Fraser 1991; Vitale 2000).  According to Fraser, individual rights are directly linked to the 
public sphere and the autonomy of this space, „the public sphere … is a theatre for debating and 
deliberating rather than for buying and selling‟ (Fraser 1991, p. 57).   
The need to democratise civil society and the bourgeoisie public sphere converge in 
contemporary theories of a global civil society or global public sphere (Giddens, Kaldor 2003, 
Castells 2008). Important to these discussions is the „intermediary‟ signifier of communication 
networks. Communication networks operate at both the national and international level, and they 
potential represent a means of actualising the democratic potential of civil society. Castells 
argues that while the concept of „civil society‟ may comprise formalised institutions these 
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associations are representative of social values and a mouthpiece for participants in a global 
society (Castells 2008).  
„The global civil society is the organised expression of the values and interests of 
society. The relationships between government and civil society and their interaction 
via the public sphere define the polity of society‟ (Castells 2008, p. 78).  
The political boarders of nation-states are crossed by transnational communication networks 
comprised of social media sites, which include Web 2.0 in the form of YouTube, Facebook and 
MySpace. These arguably lead to the emergence of an internal discursive arena (Tremayne 2007; 
Castells 2008).  Public sphere theories argue that the autonomy of international publics can be 
maintained via the implementation of the discourse principle that affords citizens communicative 
equality (Habermas, Fraser 2007).  
Yet there has been substantial questioning of the democratic potential of the public sphere in late 
capitalism. Barber (1984) touches on a commonly held view within the social sciences that the 
role of the citizen in late-modern societies has been usurped by consumerist logic (Barber 1984). 
Habermas puts stronger words to this idea by outlining how the „lifeworld‟ has been colonised 
by the processes of free enterprise (Barber in Giddens 2001, p. 274; Habermas 1989, p. 30).  The 
wealth produced by capitalist enterprise should be able to aid social goals and improve social 
realities, despite empirical evidence to suggest the contrary (Kaldor et al 2001; Kaldor 2003; 
Keane 2003; Giddens 2001).  John Keane (2003) supports the theory of a global civil society 
adopting the democratic institutions of the nation-sate in order to combat the social and 
economic injustices of unfettered capitalism (Keane 2003, p. 66-7).  Also, addressing crises of 
economic inequality and political inefficiency is the burgeoning construction of a cosmopolitan 
stage designed to embrace cultural communications and enhance civic participation (Beck 2007).  
The „crisis‟ facing civil society is theorised as the influence of international forces on public 
institutions and the inability of these governments to act autonomously (Beck 2006).  
Participation in the global civil society is described as a self-reflective process of „self-
interpretation, self-observation, self-opening, self discovery, indeed their self-invention‟ (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim 1999, p. 166).  In essence, the participatory experience in late-modern 
societies is defined by communication exchanges and experiences that due to their correlation 
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with dialogical reason demand constant revision (Giddens 1998; Beck and Beck Gernsheim 1999; 
Habermas 1989).  An international discourse reinterprets the traditional relationship between 
democracy and the nation-state which in turn changes the identity of citizens who become 
members of a global political society. The ability of national bodies to stimulate internal 
economic growth, foster healthy working environments and protect their public from acts of 
terrorism or ecological danger diminishes the effectiveness of nation governments into question 
(Fraser 2007).   
The challenge new modes of communication and market practices pose to the nation-state is 
detailed in Ulrich Beck‟s (2006) studies into cosmopolitan democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy 
is principally a response to the problems postured toward contemporary democracy in a political 
landscape where multi-national corporations exert increasing economic power and in doing so 
undermine the autonomy of the nation-state (Beck 2006).   An important development to emerge 
from the decline of public spaces in society and the development of virtual public spheres is the 
move towards humanitarian notions of civil society (Gilbert 2002; Beck2006). The concept of 
civil society is increasingly used to canvas normative ideals of and individual and collective 
rights (Frankenburg).  A possible reason for this change in the normative content of civil society, 
aside from those previously mentioned, is the demise of the welfare state the bureaucratic 
interventions which sought to correct the social and economic inequalities produced by 
capitalism  (Frankenburg, p. 195).  
The relationship forged between concepts of civil society, the public sphere and transnational 
discourses on social justice is arguably based on the proposition that social and economic rights 
are only possible with the provision of an autonomous public space (Castells 2008). A view 
summarised in Frankenburg‟s writing on civil society and social justice:  
 „Central to civil society is the concept of public freedom as practised in the public 
sphere, where citizens articulate their opinions, organise and bring to the fore their 
interests and try to shape their polity‟ (Frankenburg in Keane, p. 197).  
Impregnating the political boarders of democracy with cultural values, specific to the Western 
philosophical tradition, is problematic and a thematic concern developed in the writing of 
contemporary democratic theorists. The major defence of such a position is arguably a pragmatic 
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one namely, that the reality of an international global economy requires previously isolated 
actors to communicate with one another in order to steer free enterprise and uphold the political 
rights of individuals (Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor 2001).  
The process of securing social and economic rights in order to guarantee the private autonomies 
of a global publics draws on the intermediary qualities of the public sphere to communicate 
between the state, the market and civil society, and is sometimes referred to as the 
„democratisation of civil society‟ (Keane 1988, p. 26; Castells 2008). It also requires the 
development of public policies that redistribute some of the wealth created by capitalist 
enterprise in order to recognise the political efficacy of individuals whose communicative 
capacities are currently being stymied (Fraser 1991; 2007). An international arena calls the 
substantive qualities of civil society into question as such theories of the public sphere and 
communicative rights are normative efforts to „civilise‟ or „democratise‟ the contemporary 
concept of „civil society‟. Yet, there is need for a more detailed discussion on how capitalism as 
it is currently practiced will support environmental or humanitarian social movements. This is of 
paramount concern at a time when the integrity of media communications is in dispute and 
governments are attempting to restrict internet content (Castells 2008).  
Aligning person and global perspectives of democracy is Giddens, whose  rather broad definition 
of civil society, described as the „wider social community‟ existing outside of the state, is 
realised in the coming together of smaller groups of people whose relationships are formed on 
individual levels and expressed on a transnational stage (Giddens 1998, p. 65). This theory of 
civil society corresponds with a broader study on democracy intimacy, discussed in the previous 
chapter, which examines the processes by which interpersonal relations are at once localised and 
also a part of the global communication transmissions. Communication technologies are thought 
to not only advance human knowledge, but also change the possibilities of inter-subjective 
relationships. They do so by questioning traditions and breaking down the cultural ownership of 
social significations which then allows for social interactions to be reconceptualised (Giddens 
1998; Beck and Beck Grimsheim 1999, p. 165-6). In line with this theory, citizen-participation is 
at once intimate and political in a statement that dissolves the traditional divisions between 
private and public autonomy.   
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In late-modern societies, autonomous public spaces, such as civil society, are also important to 
notions of personal and collective emancipation (Giddens 1991). The continued importance of 
public spaces to citizen-participation has been discussed in relation to concepts of civil society 
and the communication networks of the public spheres (Fraser 2007; Castells 2008). The 
cogenesis of the concepts of civil society and the public sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries highlights their importance to modernity as well as contemporary notions of liberty 
namely, self determination, and the transformative potential of society (Habermas 1989; Arnason 
1990, p. 43).  The once close affinity between the institutional structure of the nation-state and 
civil society has also been discussed with reference to public autonomy, the political economy 
and the physical settings that constitute the geography of civil society (Dryzek 2000, p. 115). The 
difficulty this relationship poses to democracy has been explored at a time when global 
economies are creating new social spaces and the architecture of the state is struggling to remain 
relevant in an international arena. 
Two definitions of civil society were presented during the course of this study. The first 
definition referred to the network of voluntary associations that depicts the geography of civil 
society. This led to an exposition on different theories of civil society and the separation of 
private and public spheres for participation. The tension between these spheres was shown to 
present difficulties to liberal theories of participation. Within civil society another sphere 
characterised by communication channels accentuated the discursive properties of public forums. 
The differing accounts of civil society examined within this chapter cross between liberal and 
republican philosophical traditions. These different modes of though have been able to highlight 
a number of political asymmetries, most notably, the juxtaposition of universal principles of 
equality with social exclusion. In the course of this comparison it was found that civil society has 
the potential to agitate for increasing participation levels. It is this latter version of civil society 
that is important to the following chapter on deliberation and discourse.  
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Deliberation and Democracy 
 
 
In contemporary societies, the desire for widespread and effective citizen-participation has 
coincided with the development of deliberative democracy. The term „deliberative democracy‟ 
refers to a variety of competing theoretical and empirical perspectives which makes it difficult to 
present a single definition of deliberation (Bohman and Rehg 1997). Instead, this thesis draws on 
the theory of discourse democracy as it is presented by Jurgen Habermas and the empirically 
grounded research of John Rawls and Joshua Cohen, to explore the possibilities of deliberation 
as a model of democracy (Habermas 1996).  Deliberative democracy is important to the central 
question of this thesis, namely, the extent to which deliberation is in fact participatory, and the 
ability of new democratic innovations to satisfy the social demand for participation.  
In this chapter, the model of deliberative democracy is discussed in relation to the discourse 
principle that introduces a new standard for participation and in terms of the limits social and 
economic inequalities place on the potential implementation of this new democratic innovation. 
At a local level, the empirical examples of deliberative democracy often include: focus groups, 
citizen‟s juries, online discussion panels and a range of associational or council feedback 
committees (Carson and Gelber 2001).  This “mechanism” is applied to issues of local planning 
as well as the politics of new social movements such as environmental discourses (Dryzek).  
There have also been calls to utilise the discourse and consensus building features on an 
international scale (Dryzek 2000), the model used to analyse these claims is often the political 
institutions of the European Union (James Fishkin). 
In this chapter, the writing of Habermas, Rawls and Cohen are taken as disclosing the underlying 
features of what can be broadly termed as dialogical reason, a precept significant to 
contemporary theorising on the role of democracy in complex modern societies (Kalyvas 2001).  
The components of dialogical reason begin with competing definitions of reason described as 
“communicative reason”, “overlapping consensus” and “reasonable pluralism” (Habermas 1996; 
Rawls 1993; Cohen 1999). The deliberative accounts of reason depart from the philosophical 
positions of Weber and his theory of charismatic authority, which suggests that the formation of 
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public opinion is easily distorted by those in positions of power, as well as the perceived inability 
of citizens‟ to engage in reasoned public debates.  Deliberative democracy represents a clear 
transition away from economic or political accounts of democracy as well reflecting the 
diminishing support of elite democracy (Talisse 2003). This is made apparent in the alternate 
imaginings of the individuals‟ capacity for collective decision-making and the processes 
involved in justifying these decisions as they are conceptualised by deliberative democrats.  
For much of the twentieth century, economic and political perspectives that sought to limit the 
role of participation dominated democratic theory. As we saw theories in previous chapters, 
political sociologies drew heavily on Weberian ideas of reason to suggest members of the 
general public were ill equipped for the demands of decision-making (Schumpeter 2003 [1943]; 
Michels 1962; Weber 1978; Lipset 1956; Arnason 1990). This understating of reason influenced 
the writing of political sociologist Joseph Schumpeter, whose minimalist approach sought to 
restrict democracy to casting votes and competing in elections. Schumpeter also argued against 
large-scale political participation; instead favouring a type of governance upheld by ruling elites 
(Schumpeter 2003 [1943]). Elite democracy based its sociological and political assertions in the 
type of empiricism popular to political sociology of the time, which sought to make causal links 
between lower levels of participation in civic practices, such as volunteering, voting and 
associational memberships with citizen malaise (Michels 1962; Lipset 1956).   
While ideas of political apathy still inform social research and policy, including Robert Putman‟s 
empirical studies of volunteerism in civic associations, the questions used to frame and later 
interpret societal participation in the political process have changed (Putman 1993; 1998). 
Significantly, it was Rawls‟ conceptualisation of justice and the close association that this 
concept has with normative ideas of fairness that have led to a reinterpretation of the relationship 
between democracy and participation (Rawls; Talisse; Cohen). The traditional liberal emphasis 
on voting and aggregation at the expense of broader studies is now negatively viewed as „thin 
democracy‟ (Elster 1986). The theoretical limits of „thin‟ democracy and its support of liberal 
elitism have come under the attack of many democratic theorists who argue in favour of 
practices aimed at „deepening‟ and indeed „democratising‟ the concept of democracy  (Held 
2007; De Sousa Santos 2009; Vitale 2006; Arnason 1990; Fraser 1991; 2007; Habermas 1996; 
Cohen 1989; Dryzek 2006).  
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The theory of deliberative democracy has its philosophical roots in American pragmatism. John 
Dewey suggests that democracy is established in discussion, practiced in social institutions and 
employed to structure social relations (Dewey 2009, p. 54). Dewey‟s ideal version of democracy 
focuses on the „means‟ of political discussion and argumentation.  Dewey stresses the 
importance of education, conceived of as an individual and collective learning process, as a 
transformative experience (Browne 2009).  In this way democracy is more than just a political 
idea or regime, it is understood as a social practice and method for inquiry. By means of public 
discussion and participation, democracy is able to overcome differences and prejudice by 
bringing individuals into contact with alternate customs (Dewey 2010, p. 54). Democracy is a 
method for overcoming problems faced by individuals and collectives and it is imbued with the 
type of discussion that requires participants to consider their actions, which are based on beliefs, 
vis-à-vis with the views of others (Dewey 1999, ed2; Dewey 2010).  In my opinion, reference to 
the supposed methodology of democracy transfers attention away from utopian discussions over 
the composition of “the good life” toward the process by which such ideals might be reached.  
Dewey‟s focus on procedure places public discussion at the forefront of democracy. Public 
consultation, which encourages interactive debate and negotiation, also mirrors the 
„emancipatory‟ nature of modernist thought. As Dewey states, „the essential need ... is the 
improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion‟ (Dewey in 
Habermas 1998, p.304). The Habermasian version of deliberative democracy is a detailed theory 
of citizen-participation, which extends on Dewey‟s theories of dialogue and unrestrained 
discussion. Important to this particular theory are two concepts: “communicative action” and 
“communicative power” (Salam 2003). Communicative action describes a procedure concerned 
with the formation of public opinion or „publicity‟.  This is for Habermas a highly rational 
process, as he states, „communicative action refers to a process of argumentation in which those 
taking part justify their validity claims before an ideally expanded audience‟ (Habermas 1998, p. 
322).  
John Dryzek describes this change or shift in emphasis as the „deliberative turn‟ (Dryzek 2001, p. 
651).  The „deliberative turn‟ is by definition a departure from Schumpeters‟ idea of public 
apathy and Dahl‟s defence of polyarchy. It marks a shift of focus in normative and empirical 
accounts of democracy. This adjustment of how participation is viewed repositions the 
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responsibility for political engagement, moving away from an „apathetic‟ individual toward a 
„participatory‟ collective. It is also representative of a change in the types of reasoning being 
used to inform a sociological perspective of democracy. Nonetheless, questions have been posed 
concerning whether deliberative theories of democracy sufficiently take into account social 
inequalities. Social inequalities may prevent participation and it is necessary then to develop 
means of overcoming these obstacles.  
Habermas arguably presents the most substantive account of deliberative democracy, therefore 
making his theory the starting point for considerations on deliberation (Mouffe 1999; Vitale 
2006). The relevance of Habermas to a sociological study of the deliberative democratic model is 
also due to his theory of discourse democracy requiring social and economic equality within 
horizontal power relations (Cohen 1999 p. 388). The theory of discourse democracy outlines the 
structure of a discursive space that can be defined as „a self-organising community of free and 
equal citizens‟ (Habermas 1996, p. 7). In Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996), Habermas presents his most complete 
rendering of discursive democracy. It involves his own version of participation based on the 
theory of communicative reason. Habermas argues that discursive democracy is able to 
formulate a new communication community by combining the strengths of the civic republican 
and liberal traditions, the two most dominant approaches in the study of democracy. The core of 
this theory is an attempt to harmonise republican ideas of participation, centred on collectively 
engaged citizens who are able to place community needs above individual concerns, and liberal 
institutionalism‟s view that citizenship rights are most clearly represented in the legal system 
(Habermas 1996; Bohman 1997).  
Discourse theory attempts to recast aspects of Athenian democracy, representative and 
participatory democracy within the ethical frame of liberalism (Dryzek 2000). The coming 
together of different theoretical traditions is used to emphasise the importance of both 
participation (conceptualised as dialogue) and law. These are seen as having equal theoretical 
and empirical importance to modern societies. By stressing the importance of a method for 
reasoned debate, Habermas draws on the writing of Dewey and attempts to instil his own 
principle of deliberation within a discursive theory of democracy. If acknowledged, an enhanced 
valuing of dialogue would effectively shift the political mood away from aggregation and contest 
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towards a new model that encourages an equality of points of view and a desire to build 
understanding rather than promote dominant opinions (Habermas 1998, p. 299). The principle of 
deliberation stresses the significance of „linguistic expression‟ over any preconceived motivation 
the orator may have in posing certain viewpoints (Habermas 1984, p. 275). The human capacity 
for dialogue acts as the basis for fostering social integration and building solidarity (Habermas 
1998, p. 299). And the social acceptability of validity claims made in public discussion is tied to 
a general rule of consensus (Bohman and Rehg in Habermas 1996).  
According to Habermas, deliberative democracy maintains political liberalism‟s separation of the 
private and public spheres. At the same time, making the provision for an open „discursive space‟ 
that is independent of the economy and bureaucratic arm of the nation-state (Habermas 1996, p. 
299).  Habermas holds a similar position to Hannah Arendt, as both authors imagine democratic 
societies built upon the pillars of an autonomous public space and active citizenry (Arendt 1958, 
p. 198; Vitale 2010, p. 754). Within this theoretical framework, the concept of communicative 
action identifies the social practices of speaking and listening, or inter-subjective action, as the 
basic tools required to achieve compromise and build consensus (Arendt 1958).  The theory of 
communicative action is discussed in an ideal situation whereby social and economic inequalities 
do not prevent equal participation (Habermas 1981, p. 275; 1996; 2006).  Critics of deliberative 
democracy argue that it is impossible to ignore the social reality of highly stratified societies and 
the impacts this would inevitably have on citizens‟ participation (Fraser 1991).  
A discourse theory of democracy is, „concerned with finite embodied actors who are socialised 
in concrete forms of life, situated in historical time and social space, and caught up in networks 
of communication‟ (Habermas 1998, p. 324). Habermas‟ deliberative democratic model is 
intended to scrutinise the role of citizen and state in liberal nation-states governed in relation to 
capitalist ideals. Importantly, the „embodied actors‟ at the centre of deliberative democracy are 
attributed dual identities, that of citizen and communicative actor (Salam 2003; Vitale 2010). 
The „inter-subjective‟ communication expected of participants supposedly prevents the 
subordination of the individual to the general will (Rousseau in Vitale 2010, p. 754).   
The second concept important to a discursive theory of democracy is communicative power. 
Communicative power is assigned the task of harnessing the outcomes of public deliberation and 
positioning them within an ethical framework of legally binding rules (Habermas 1998; Salam 
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2003). This follows on from the liberal tradition of legislation that views social values as 
embodied in customs that are later transformed into law. Placing emphasis on deliberation usurps 
the traditional role of custom; which can be involuntarily imposed on citizens by means of 
religion, gender, race or ethnicity and social class.  While these categorical identities inform 
social realities, or what Habermas refers to as the „lifeworld‟, they can – according to Habermas - 
also represent anachronistic views that are at times incompatible with the culmination of the 
modern project.   
Accordingly, „communicative actors‟ are those whose role it is to take part in an „unrestrained‟ 
process of public will-formation (Habermas 1998, p. 324). This participation should form public 
opinion, steer political argumentation and policy directions, and ultimately enable an agreement 
about the norms for the governance of a politicised society. This procedural model of democracy 
is both the major strength and also weakness behind theories of deliberation. As well as outlining 
possibilities for enhancing democratic practice, the concept of deliberation aims to strengthen the 
autonomy of the „lifeworld‟ and resist the imperialism of the system. The Habermasian idea of 
the „lifeworld‟ can be described as, „the background for shared meaning that provides the basis 
for ordinary symbolic interaction‟ (Salam 2003, p.64). The „lifeworld‟ is also a communal space 
for inter-subjective communication that is located in civil society (Habermas 1985, p. 126).  
In Habermas‟ critique of capitalism, he argues that the lifeworld is being „colonised‟ by coercive 
economic agendas and over-extended bureaucracies (Habermas 1985). The ensuing stymieing of 
discussion occurs in capitalist societies when citizens only follow the logic of market rationality 
and make decisions to advance self-gain. Discourse theory is normative in its approach to 
questions of legitimacy and debates over how society „ought‟ to be. Its discursive understanding 
of reason and democracy should lead to a questioning of the governing authority of modern 
liberal democracies. The discourse theory of democracy conceptualises participants as active 
citizens and participation as involvement in public discussions.  Habermas states, „participants in 
argumentation proceed on the idealising assumption of a communication community without 
limits in social space and historical time‟ (Habermas 1996, p. 322). By positioning his discursive 
arena for citizen-participation on the principles of social egalitarianism, Habermas indirectly 
defends the welfare-state by reuniting notions of private and public autonomy.  
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The theories of deliberative democracy introduce the normative standard of the discourse 
principle as foundation of political legitimacy (Bohman 1997, p. 322). Bohman understands the 
deliberative democratic versions of „legitimacy‟ as implying a new principle for argumentation 
that can be loosely termed as public justification rooted in consensus (Bohman 1997). According 
to Bohman and Rehg, a deliberative version of political engagement with pubic issues can be 
defined as, „an ideal of political autonomy based on the practical reasoning of citizens‟ (Bohman 
and Rehg 1997, p. ix). This definition of deliberation demarcates the political parameters for a 
procedural model of democracy, as stipulated in the writing of Jon Elster, Joshua Cohen, Jurgen 
Habermas and John Rawls (Bohman and Regh 1997). The main thematic of these authors are 
discussed as notions of „legitimacy‟, „rational legislation, participatory politics and civic-self 
governance‟ (Bohman and Regh 1997, p. ix).  
A normative theory of democracy has to engage with the arguments put forward in Rousseau‟s 
treatment of the subject of public justification.  In Rousseau‟s (2003) Social Contract the social 
arrangements that come to govern society are considered to be legitimate if they are the outcome 
of public deliberation. The justifications behind different norms, which are later used to order 
society, come together under the umbrella of will-formation and direct citizen involvement in 
any lawmaking processes. This interpretation of legitimacy is critical of elitist forms of 
democracy, because it subjects all citizens to popularised sovereignty, that is, the „general‟ or 
agreed upon will of the majority of citizens. It also assumes a notion of social equality that views 
uneven distributions of wealth, property, or labour as a risk to democracy. This risk to 
democracy is when any or all of these inequalities reach a point that disenables other citizens 
from contesting the dominance associated with the correlating economic or political power 
differentials (Rosseau 2003; Bohman and Regh 1997).  In essence, Rousseau argues that 
inequality is a product of society that can be rectified by the direct participation of citizens in 
law-making. 
Rousseau contends that any legally binding rule needs community support and therefore various 
degrees of social equality to uphold the responsibilities of governance namely, securing the 
freedom of the governed (2003).  The revival of social contract theories, especially the account 
of justification put forward by Rousseau, can be seen in the writing of a number of contemporary 
authors whose contributions to deliberation help to inform this democratic model.  In the first 
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chapter I showed how participation had been interpreted in different ways and these 
disagreements are evident in the contrast between Republican and Liberal notions of the social 
contract.  
John Rawls‟ (1971) A Theory of Justice outlines two principles of fairness that are considered 
essential to the private reasoning and public decision making of equal citizens. The first principle 
looks at equality in terms of protection, endowing citizens with basic rights and liberties that 
prevent them from the subjugation of more powerful groups in society. The second principle 
extends the liberal meaning of „basic rights‟ to education and employment thus securing the 
ability of all citizens to compete for positions in public office and influence public policy. Rawls‟ 
main contribution to the deliberative model of democracy is his Idea of Public Reason which 
attempts an alternate response to Kant‟s essay on the Enlightenment by synthesising public 
reason and deliberation (Kant 1784; Rawls 1971). This fusion helps to contextualise the 
deliberative space in two ways; constraining public debates by imposing a deliberative standard 
on the content and outcome of discussions; and investing such debates with a pluralistic 
character common to contemporary liberal societies.  
 The problem of pluralism for deliberative democracy informs Rawls own dissertation of “over-
lapping reason”. Within Rawls‟ deliberative model, the subject matter of public discussions is 
limited to concerns relating to justice and the established legal constitution (Goldfinger 2009).  
This version upholds traditional liberal ideals of individual privacy and views the total „publicity‟ 
account put forward by Habermas as problematic. Even so, Rawls and Habermas are similar in 
outlining clear rules for participants engaging in a deliberative discussion based on consensus 
building practices. As far as content is concerned, Rawls limits discussion to questions important 
to public consideration. These are phrased as, „who has the right to vote, or what religions are to 
be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property‟ (Rawls 
1993, p. 214).   
These types of questions are viewed as attempts to legitimise laws by opening them to public 
scrutiny, however they are by nature restrictive and are therefore limited in their ability to 
transform or dramatically alter society. Deliberations on constitutional matters are defined in 
terms of how society should be organised, as such queries over the role of the legislature, 
executive and judiciary and rules guiding the political process are questions import to a liberal 
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interpretation of deliberation. Public reason is also applied to matters of equality, basic rights and 
the liberties associated with citizenship. The application of public reason in this context attempts 
to guarantee the respect of personal freedoms by the majority of citizens involved in public 
deliberations and the legislators who represent them (Rawls 1993, p. 227).  
This outline of the content and means of deliberation are guided by an overarching norm of 
justification referred to as consensus building. These practices compel citizens to engage in 
rational debates and submit their concerns to the test of public scrutiny (Bohman 1997, p.321). In 
theories of deliberation, the discussion process allows participants to define and later observe 
their own laws. The legitimacy of these rules is bound to the principal of consensus. Rawls puts 
forward a fairly limited interpretation of consensus and therefore a narrow definition of 
deliberation. As Rawls states, „so long as there is a firm agreement on the constitutional 
essentials and established political procedures are reasonably regarded as fair, willing political 
and social cooperation between free and equal citizens can normally be maintained (Rawls 1993, 
p. 230). The political analysis undertaken by Rawls downplays the influence of social 
inequalities on deliberation and liberty.   
Rawls imposes limits on deliberation due to a concern for the practical implementation and 
feasibility of wide-spread deliberation within the political structure of the modern-nation state. 
Rawls idea of an “overlapping consensus” attempts to reconcile the type of pluralism that has 
come to define liberal nations with the philosophical leanings of political legitimacy (Rawls 
1993, p.134). In essence, the theory of “overlapping consensus” is one answer to the question of 
how to uphold private autonomy in public arenas characterised by coexistence of various moral, 
religious and ideological doctrines (Rawls 1993; Cohen 1999; Dryzek 2006; Waldron 2004). 
Rawls idea of “overlapping consensus” differs from Habermas‟s discourse theory of democracy. 
Rawls maintains a liberal ideal of society, whereas the theory presented by Habermas envisages 
a model for democracy based on inclusive decision making. The gaps between the two theorists 
are demonstrated by the writing of deliberative democrat Joshua Cohen, whose idea of 
“reasonable pluralism” has come to inform empirical models of public deliberation such as 
citizen juries, collective assemblies, polling, and public consultations.  
Cohen is, like Rawls, similarly concerned with limiting the content of deliberations. Cohen‟s 
four features of deliberation are stipulated as: (1) voluntary membership of an association, (2) 
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that the association is pluralistic representing a variety of doctrines, (3) the deliberative 
procedure is respected as the basis for any unfolding discussions legitimacy and (4) members 
acknowledge the equal capacity of themselves and others to deliberate (Cohen p.31).  According 
to Cohen the above features outline a procedure for „the public use of reason‟ which is located 
within the context of a deliberative forum and results in the formation of “collective choice” 
outcomes, thus defining his version of “pluralistic reason” (Cohen p. 36).  Pluralism evidently 
poses problems for democrats, a consideration made clear by Zablocki‟s (1980) criticism of 
consensus practices that disallowed dissent. Young (1996) levels similar claims at the 
deliberative model arguing that some normative approaches to consensus were in danger of 
subjugating individual autonomy to the stability provided by liberal elites (Young 1996, p. 126). 
The supposed neutrality of pluralism is brought to attention in the critiques of more radical 
pluralists (Dryzek 2006).  
Theorists suggest liberal ideas of consensus are misleading given the dislocation of the liberal 
rhetoric of „freedom‟ from the experiential evidence of minority voices struggling to challenge 
dominant social values (Mouffe 1996; 1999; Young 1996).  In order for more radical versions of 
pluralism to take effect Mouffe (1996) argues for the rejection of „a substantiative idea of the 
good life‟ (Mouffe 1996, p. 246).  Despite its critique of the colonisation of the lifeworld, 
Habermas‟s idea of democratic legitimacy underestimates the power of the economic system and 
its control over social institutions.  Elderman (1998) argues that while „discourse‟ can be thought 
of as „emancipatory‟ on a normative level, the social facts of status and self interest prevent such 
theories from being substantiated in complex societies (Elderman 1998, p. 10).  Yet, the same 
criticism could also be levelled at the models for deliberation presented by Rawls and Cohen.  
Elderman‟s evaluation of Habermas‟ discourse theory of democracy highlights underlying 
tensions. Tensions that include, a perceived gap between normative theory and practice, an 
exhaustive focus on procedure, or „how‟ debate is undertaken, at the expensive of questioning its 
accessibility and how best to negotiate contrasting views of citizenship and culture, as is evident 
in the conflict between republicanism and liberalism.  Habermas, Rawls and Cohen present a 
process of lawmaking based on discussion and the deliberative principal of consensus building. 
Yet there are also sharp philosophical differences that change the overall tone of their accounts 
of deliberation. While Habermas takes on certain ideas from liberalism evidenced in the adoption 
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of civic institutions and political culture he also rejects the types of elitism inherent to such a 
system on the grounds that they invariably contribute to social and economic inequalities.  
Fraser (1990) identifies a lacuna in the deliberative account of democracy whereby real life 
social and economic conditions are not taken into consideration. This is in part due to its 
depicting an ideal scenario. The normative grounds adopted by this theory fail to take into 
account the social reality of inequality or the intertwining role a wide range of participants have 
in steering public policy (Vitale 2006). This limits the participatory potential of deliberative 
democracy as it is currently practiced as well as the ability of the discourse principle to lift 
participants circumstances to the level needed to legitimise representative governments.  Kalyvas 
(2001) makes a clear case against deliberation by suggesting that its platform in argument is 
largely undemocratic. He also draws attention to the tension between ideology and discourse, 
arguing that is hard to separate these two influences on the way participation is practiced 
(Kalyvas 2001, p.6).  
At the centre of debates on deliberation is the defence of private and public autonomy; what 
Cohen refers to as „the rights of participation‟ (Cohen). Arguably, Habermas goes about securing 
„the rights of participation‟ by protecting a discursive arena for free participation, while Rawls 
and Cohen present liberal versions of deliberation that highlight the complexity of modern 
societies. This notion of complexity place limits on the Habermasian model. Rawls and Cohen 
prefer a more restrained version of deliberation. One that can be used as a mechanism for 
advancing the public interest without disrupting its current institutional make-up of a community 
based on the economic market and civic institutions.  
Deliberative democracy imagines a society of active citizens‟ who are informed and able to draw 
rational conclusions from unrestrained public discussions. The networks of communication that 
guide these dialogues are supported by a principle that in theory is not only plausible but also 
makes for a highly convincing argument in late-modern societies that are characterised by the 
news media. In addition to the new social geographies that are being mapped by internet users 
across the globe. Yet, as Mouffe and Fraser have demonstrated in their critiques of discourse and 
communication theories the main limit to this model of democracy is its dislocation from a 
serious engagement with the social and economic inequalities that influence everyday life.   
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The Norm of Participation 
 
 
 
My thesis has been guided by a simple question: does deliberative democracy broaden and 
enhance citizen-participation? I have attempted to demonstrate a desire for participation in late-
modern societies by reference to the examples of new democratic innovations and the way they 
imagine participants as the central actors in democracy. These innovations include participatory 
democracy, new social movements, participatory budgeting and deliberative democracy. An 
emphasis on deliberative democracy has been used to illustrate the importance of autonomous 
public spaces to the discourse principle and the value of unrestrained dialogue in reasoned 
decision making. The Weberian theory of elite democracy and the restrictions this model of 
democracy places on citizen-participation was contrasted with the politics of participatory 
democracy.  These modern versions of liberalisms represent different approaches to analysing 
participation and of popular sovereignty.  
In the beginning sections of this thesis, the comparison of the liberty of the Ancients and the 
Moderns led to a detailed discussion on Athenian and modern democracy. The liberty of the 
Ancients was defined as the „active and constant participation in collective power‟ (Constant 
1988, p. 316, 323). It was then shown that in Athenian democracy the idea of liberty was closely 
associated with notions of collective action. This meant that citizen-participation in the decision 
making processes of holding office and deliberating on public issues could be defined as political 
emancipation. The subjugation of individual needs and aspirations to the general-will was often 
interpreted as a positive characteristic of society.  Participation in the Athenian model of 
democracy also required citizens‟ to respect one another as equals. At the time equality was 
thought of as a universal principle however any contemporary studies of this period would show 
a large disparity between the social status of citizens‟ and others.  This earlier form of political 
emancipation was compared with modern understandings of liberty in order to better understand 
the aspirations of participants in modern democracies.  
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The example of Athenian democracy demonstrated how the idea of positive liberty can be 
associated with political emancipation and collective action (Constant 1998). In its extreme form 
this could be seen as a major weakness of ancient Greek and Roman democracies as well as 
producing a valid criticism of their definition of liberation.  In modern democracies, the notion of 
liberty was reinterpreted and came to be associated with individualism. In eighteenth century 
Europe the re-emergence of democracy coincided with the rise of a new mercantile class and a 
reading public. It also marked a period of significant structural change in the form of 
industrialisation and capitalism as well as the rise of liberalism. During this period liberty was 
thought of as individual rights such as the right to private property and the desire for protection. 
The liberty of the Moderns or „individual liberty‟ was heavily influenced by the writing of the 
Enlightenment thinkers and classical liberalism (Constant 1988, p. 316, 323).   
This understanding of political emancipation was closely tied to the development of the nation-
state and representative government. This meant that the means to liberation were formalised in 
the political process of periodic elections, voting and membership of a trade labour union or 
political party.  The modes of social life that characterised modernity led to the formation of 
formalised boundaries between the private and public lives of participants. It was thought that 
separating these two spheres would protect the individual liberties of participants. In 
contemporary democracies, participants are often unable to exercise the political authority that is 
associated with liberty to place limits on the power of representative governments and the 
capitalism. The separation of liberty from notions of fraternity and solidarity has led to a 
paradoxical situation whereby the political processes that were designed to improve the political 
rights of citizens‟ are obstructing the realisation of this desire (Wagner 2008).  
The powerlessness of citizens‟ sits at odds with the Weberian theory of elite democracy that 
argued against widespread participation.  Elite democracy endorses a narrow definition of 
participation in order to maintain the liberty of individuals‟. The theory of charismatic authority, 
as it was presented by Weber, supported the system of rule by rotating elites due to the easy 
manipulation of the wider social community by those in positions of power. It was also 
suggested that the scale of modern nation-states made direct democracy unfeasible. These ideas 
were extended upon in the political sociologies of the early twentieth century and can be found in 
the writing of Schumpeter, Michels‟ and Lipset. In these studies low levels of citizen-
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participation and the tendency of supposedly egalitarian organisation to form oligarchies were 
interpreted as evidence of a failure on the part of citizens‟ to participate in democracy. These 
findings were later reinterpreted by advocates of participatory democracy as a condemnation of 
the representative model of democracy and the structural aspects of society that were seen to 
impede participation. 
The critique of liberal democracies by advocates of participatory democracy reintroduced the 
idea of positive liberty to discussions on citizen-participation. Pateman (1970) and Macpherson 
(1977) positioned the concept of a participatory model of democracy in opposition to elite or 
neoliberal forms of government that were occupying the political debates of the 1970s (Hayek 
1960; Nozick 1974). It was thought that increasing participation would lead to the socialisation 
of democracy and the improved social and economic conditions of participants.  This is an idea 
that has remained relevant and continues to inform new democratic innovations such as new 
social movements, participatory budgeting, democracy as intimacy and deliberative democracy.   
Difficulties encountered by advocates of participatory democracy are the questions over how to 
extend democracy past the nation-state. There is also the need to make connections between 
liberation, civil society and the public sphere.  The fall of Marxist-Leninism in Central and 
Easter Europe during the late 1980s and rise of democracy in Latin American countries is 
increasingly used as evidence of the democratising potential of civil society. Civil society was 
defined as, „a network of various voluntary associations, movements and the channels of 
communication between them insofar as they serve as mediating links between the private and 
the political spheres‟ (Markus 2001, p. 1013).  The features of civil society that are important to 
democracy include: a public setting for participation and the right to form associations in these 
spaces.  It was also shown that civil society is characterised by citizen-participation in the form 
of communication. Habermas described this aspect of civil society as the formalisation of 
different discourses in social institutions (Habermas 1996, p. 367).   
The themes of communication and association are important to new democratic innovations. The 
desire to influence the structure of society and social relationships are motivations that inform 
the discourses of new social movements. Cohen and Arato (1992) define new social movements 
as, „the dynamic element in the processes that might realise the positive potential of modern civil 
societies‟ (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 492). Sousa Santos (2007) conceptualised new social 
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movements as a more recent example of participatory democracy and amplified their role in his 
theory of „democratising democracy‟ (Sousa Santos, p. ix). In a different vein, Inglehart (1990) 
examined the cognitive values of new social movements while also suggesting that their 
burgeoning popularity was based on higher levels of education and an increase in the political 
skills of citizens‟ (Inglehart 1990, p. 372). The way these movements interpret liberty is of real 
interest and an important measure for evaluating deliberative democracy.  The feminist, gay and 
lesbian, ecological and social justice discourses of these movements redefine liberty and the 
definition of political emancipation. My analysis suggests that there is a tension between the 
liberal understanding of deliberation and the demands of these movements for participation.  
„Intimacy as democracy‟ develops a new theory of liberty and collapses the divide between 
private and public spheres within a global society. According to Giddens (1991) the influence of 
new social movements and identity politics can be felt in the interpersonal relationships that 
characterise domestic life.  He argues that family dynamics are increasingly egalitarian while 
intimate relationships based on dialogue and open channels of communication foster this new 
expression of social equality. Across the other side of the globe examples of participatory 
democracy have been manifesting in the form of participatory budgeting. In Latin America and 
most notably Porte Alegre, Brazil, networks of community organisations are working to increase 
citizen-participation in the public spending initiatives of local municipals.  Participatory 
budgeting has theoretical ties to representative democracy and civil society concepts of 
association. It represents a wide departure from democracy as intimacy however the motif of 
broadening democracy combines these otherwise disparate traditions.  
Deliberative democracy represents another expression of participatory democracy and attempt to 
extend democracy. The procedural model of democracy shares little in common with the writing 
of C.B. Macpherson or Pateman however it continues in their tradition of encouraging citizens‟ 
to be more active. From the 1980s onwards deliberative democracy and its discourse principle 
have been important features of social, legal and political theory. The discourse principle was 
defined as: „Only those [legal] statues may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent … of 
all citizens in the discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted‟ 
(Habermas 1996, p. 110).  It is based on dialogue and the ability of participants‟ to engage in 
reasoned debates. Three definitions of reason were presented in this exposition: communicative 
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reason (Habermas 1996), overlapping consensus (Rawls 1993) and reasonable pluralism (Cohen 
1999). The later two theories reflect a move toward a definition of deliberation that is more in 
line with political liberalism.  
The characteristics of deliberative democracy are summarised by Dryzek (1990), „discursive 
democracy is woven ...  from threads supplied by a classical (Aristotelian) model of politics, 
participatory democracy, communicative action, practical reason and critical theory‟ (Dryzek 
1990, p. ix).  This is for the most part an accurate description of deliberative democracy however 
it fails to mention the roots of this idea in American pragmatism (Dewey 2010). The more 
substantive argument is that deliberation is increasingly thought of as a standard of democratic 
legitimacy. This an important aspect of the writing of proponents of deliberative democracy and 
it calls into question the authority of liberal democracies. The procedural model of citizen-
participation as it is presented by Habermas (1996) is deontological (Bevir 2010, p. 591). It 
argues that legitimacy is grounded on norms but it does not articulate the content of those norms. 
I feel that this is major weakness of the deliberative approach.  
Rawls argues that legitimate forms of deliberation can only take place amongst free and equal 
citizens‟ (Rawls 1993, p. 230). Cohen puts forward a detailed account of how to conduct a 
deliberative forum however his primary concerns are that participation is voluntary and that the 
participants represent a cross section of the community in questions social demographics. 
Participants are not necessarily equals but are obliged to respect the rights of others to take part 
in public discussions (Cohen, p.31). This means that along with the problems of pluralism, 
sovereignty and consensus theories of deliberative democracy are also limited by their refusal to 
effectively outline a normative criteria that would enable citizens‟ to participate as equals.  
Deliberative theories of democracy endeavour to overcome inequality through democratic 
discussion. Yet, this type of dialogue is based on the full participation of equal citizens. In this 
thesis, the circularity of this argument has been articulated as a serious dilemma for participation.   
Fraser‟s and Held‟s conclusions introduce new standards of participation. Fraser‟s theory of 
participatory parity is based on a critique of the Habermasian idea of the public sphere and 
identifies the structural inequalities that place limits on participation. The precondition of 
participatory parity was defined as „rough socio-economic equality‟ (Fraser 1991, p. 74). Her 
writing on redistribution and recognition extends on this theme and argues in favour of welfare-
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type policy initiatives. This is an argument that few theorists are making at a time when social 
democracy and the welfare state is associated with the technocratic agendas of bureaucrats and 
passive form of citizen-participation (Sousa Santos 2009). Fraser‟s studies lack a deeper 
engagement with issues of sovereignty and pluralism as it concerns modern liberalisms
1
. Fraser 
argues that participation is purely liberal: „Participatory parity, then, is the emergent historical 
“truth” of the liberal norm of the equal autonomy and moral worth of human beings‟ (Fraser 
2003, p. 232). My thesis demonstrates the limitations of Fraser‟s approach. I have shown that 
participation is common to both modern liberalisms and republican ideas of participatory 
democracy.  
Held holds a similar view of participation, however where Fraser critiques the public sphere, he 
examines Cohen‟s version of deliberation to develop his own principle of participation. He 
defines the moral content of this norm as, „the equal rights to enjoy the conditions for effective 
participation‟ (Held 1996, p. 318). If the „conditions for effective participation‟ is interpreted to 
mean „rough socio-economic equality‟ then it would appear logical to suggest that the 
participatory credentials of deliberative democracy are highly limited. In his writing on the 
modern principle of autonomy, Held positions deliberation and political emancipation as 
interdependent.  
This thesis has been positioned within modernity and it is important to close with a comment on 
the Weberian theory of modernity and the Habermasian reply. The Weberian theory of 
modernity is characterised by a process rationalisation that separates society into separate 
cultural spheres of value. They include the arts, sciences and religion as well as the private and 
public sphere. And, it is the fragmentation of cultural meaning or the breakdown in 
communication that led to a feeling of disenchantment. Habermas supports this theory to a point 
however he suggests that any divisions between the different spheres can be overcome by the 
discourse principle.  
I have shown the weaknesses of the discourse principle and deliberative democracy are a failure 
to engage with inequality. It is suggested that applying the Weberian theory of charismatic 
authority to the deliberative process would further undermine the association between 
                                                          
1
 Critics of Fraser: ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalising World’, in Fraser, N. and Honneth, A.(eds.) (2008) Adding 
Insult to Injury, Verso, New York 
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deliberative democracy and political emancipation. This is due to the easy distortion of 
information by those in positions of authority as well as the irregularities produced by capitalism 
which provide some participants with greater access to the public sphere than others. This does 
not diminish the future applications of deliberation however it does reinforce the theory that 
without rough social and economic equality the procedures of deliberative democracy are 
vulnerable to manipulation. This argument is of course important to contemporary democracies 
experiencing the impacts of extreme capitalism.   
The problems of consensus politics pose for participation go beyond the economic but these have 
not been explored
i
. I have emphasised the positive aspects of citizen-participation and presented 
a hopeful picture of the benefits of extending participation past voting. The normative and 
empirical accounts of democracy and the features of modernity have been discussed in relation to 
citizen-participation. A great deal of time was taken to explain the causal links between different 
thematic concerns. These included the importance of liberty to citizen-participation, the 
connection between civil society and the public sphere as well as the ideas tethering public 
sphere theories to deliberative democracy.  
My thesis has focused on the themes of liberty and political emancipation, civil society, 
associations, the public sphere, deliberation and reason in order to present the argument that 
there is a widening gap between notions of deliberation and liberation that is based on economic 
inequality.  The expositions that were undertaken in the body of this thesis were limited in there 
ability to examine a range of questions that are important to modern democracies. It is the 
conclusion of this study that deliberative democracy is an exciting innovation that should 
continue to be explored from a wide range of perspectives. The importance of communication 
networks to contemporary societies should not be underestimated. This model of democracy 
presents new ways to legitimise democracy and citizen-participation.  
In conclusion deliberation is a necessary feature of democracy despite its restrictions and the 
analyses of my thesis support this argument. The loss of legitimacy felt in modern democracies 
led to a discussion on alternative settings for social action. It was found that the communication 
networks of the public sphere located within civil society can accommodate participation and 
have the potential to extend this practice past the nation-state. It was also found that participation 
has a long and well documented history evidenced in both liberal and republican democracies. 
50 
 
The norm of participation is therefore intrinsic to democracy, irrespective of the model of 
popular sovereignty. It is my closing thesis that these democratic traditions show a demand for 
participation by citizens‟ that outstrips: representative systems of government and limits placed 
on participation by capitalism and deliberation. It is for this reason that a norm of participation is 
an integral feature of democracy.  
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